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Proposed Legislation Curbing the War
Powers of the President
BY JOSEPH B. KELLY*
On April 11, 1972, the Senate of the United States passed and
sent to the House Senate Bill 2956.1 It is described as "a bill to
* B.S.C., 1947, Xavier University; J.D. 1949, University of Cincin-
nati; M.A., LL.M. 1960, Georgetown University; Professor of Law, Dickin-
son School of Law.
1. S.2956, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972). Section 3, on which this
note will concentrate, is as follows:
EMERGENCY USE OF THE ARMED FORCES
In the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the
Armed Forces of the United States may be introduced in hostili-
ties, or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, only-
(1) to repel an armed attack upon the United States, its ter-
ritories and possessions; to take necessary and appropriate retalia-
tory actions in the event of such an attack; and to forestall the
direct and imminent threat of such an attack;
(2) to repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the
United States located outside of the United States, its territories
and possessions, and to forestall the direct and imminent threat of
such an attack;
(3) to protect while evacuating citizens and nationals of the
United States, as rapidly as possible, from any country in which
such citizens and nationals are present with the express or tacit
consent of the government of such country and are being sub-
jected to a direct and imminent threat to their lives, either spon-
sored by such government or beyond the power of such govern-
ment to control; but the President shall make every effort to
terminate such a threat without using the Armed Forces of the
United States, and shall, where possible, obtain the consent of the
government of such country before using the Armed Forces of the
United States to protect citizens and nationals of the United States
being evacuated from such country; or
(4) pursuant to specific statutory authorization, but authority
to introduce the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities
or in any such situation shall not be inferred (A) from any pro-
make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress,"
and titled "The War Powers Act."
In Mora v. McNamara,2 Mr. Justice Stewart, commenting on
the constitutional issues raised by the Vietnam war and the Tonkin
Bay Resolution, stated "These are large and deeply troubling ques-
tions." 3  They are large because they involve fundamental con-
cepts in the separation of powers between the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive Branches pertaining to the use of our armed forces, the
implications of which affect most aspects of our foreign policy.
They are troubling because not only does the Constitution offer,
at best, only the briefest of express guidance in the matter, but
judicial interpretations in opinions to date have not clearly de-
fined the independent war powers of the Executive.
The applicable constitutional provisions bearing both directly
and indirectly on the problem are as follows:
1. Congressional authority. Article I.
Section 8. The Congress shall have the power:
Cl. 1. To provide for the Common Defense.
Cl. 11. To declare war, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal and to make Rules concerning Cap-
tures on Land and Water.
Cl. 12. To raise and support Armies, but no appro-
priation for that use shall be for a longer
term than two years.
Cl. 13. To provide and maintain a Navy.
Cl. 14. To make rules for the Government and Reg-
ulation of the land and naval Forces.
Cl. 18. To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the
vision of law hereafter enacted, including any provision contained
in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically ex-
empts the introduction of such Armed Forces from compliance
with the provisions of this Act, or (B) from any treaty hereafter
ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifi-
cally authorizing the introduction of the Armed Forces of the
United States in hostilities or in such situation and specifically ex-
empting the introduction of such Armed Forces from compliance
with the provisions of this Act. Specific statutory authorization
is required for the assignment of members of the Armed Forces
of the United States to command, coordinate, participate in the
movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military
forces of any foreign country or government when such Armed
Forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such
forces will become engaged, in hostilities. No treaty in force at
the time of the enactment of this Act shall be construed as spe-
cific statutory authorization for, or a specific exemption permitting,
the introduction of the Armed Forces of the United States in
hostilities or in any such situation, within the meaning of this
clause (4); and no provision of law in force at the time of the
enactment of this Act shall be so construed unless such provision
specifically authorizes the introduction of such Armed Forces in
hostilities or in any such situation.
2. 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart, J. dissenting from denial of certi-
orari).
3. Id. at 935.
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foregoing Powers and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or officer thereof.
2. Executive Authority. Article II.
Section 1, Cl. 1. The executive power shall be vested
in a President.
Section 2, Cl. 1. The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States.
Cl. 2. He shall have Power, by and with the
advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provide two-thirds of
the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Amassadors, . . . consuls
Section 3, ... he shall take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed...
From these enumerated powers in Article II is derived the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of
the United States.
The central controversy in the Senate Committee hearings on
the bill surrounded the extent of Congress' authority, flowing
from its power to declare war, as opposed to the extent of the
President's authority, emanating from his triple role as Chief Ex-
ecutive of an independent branch of government, as Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces, and as the official who conducts the
foreign relations of the United States.
In regard to the President's role as Commander-in-Chief, it is
clear from the intent of the drafters of the Constitution that the
President was not to have the power to initiate hostilities, as
the King of England at that time enjoyed. Congress alone was to
have such power under its authority "to declare war."'4 However,
the actual exercise of such express constitutional authority by
Congress has never been limited to a ritual of formally "declaring
war." The existence of such a literal interpretive requirement was
rejected by the Supreme Court within a decade of the founding of
the nation. In The Eliza,, the Court drew a distinction between
"solemn wars," that is those declared by Congress, and "imperfect
wars" where a declaration of war by Congress is lacking, describ-
ing the then recent United States naval hostilities with France
4. I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 319.
5. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
as an "imperfect war." The Court then concluded that this lesser
type of war is authorized by the Constitution "-[a]s far as con-
gress tolerated and authorized the war on our part, so far may we
proceed in hostile operations."
Such authorization of hostilities by Congress need not be ex-
press, nor need it be before the commencement of hostilities. His-
torically, the President has acted initially more often without
than with the prior express consent of Congress. 7 It would be
misleading, however, to interpret the passive Congressional and
active Presidential practice of the past as indicating a war-initiat-
ing power in the President which is coextensive with, and which
exists separate from, that of Congress. Recently, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia correctly in-
terpreted the flexible historical practice of both President and
Congress as follows:
Given the intricate nature of international relations and
contemporary diplomacy, there is a myriad of conceivable
reasons why Congress might undertake a course of action
which sanctions and implements executive action but
which falls short of a formal declaration of war. For ex-
ample, treaty rights may or may not be involved on a
formal declaration of war. And the question of whether
congressional authorization to carry on certain hostilities
has in fact been given is not readily answerable in terms
of any particular provisions of the constitution. Rather as
noted hereinbefore that document provides Congress with
an array of powers which it may exercise to sanction or re-
strain executive action (power to raise and support armies,
the power over appropriations, the power to legislate in
foreign affairs, and the power to impeach.)"
Another Federal District Court made similar observations, stress-
ing the historical Presidential initiative, but coupled it with some
form of Congressional ratification:
While Congress has not formally declared war with respect
to military action in Viet Nam, nor did it in Korea, it has
given its whole hearted approval to the action of the Pres-
ident by appropriations and other implementing legisla-
tion. The President, as Commander in Chief, has always
exercised the power to begin hostilities; viewed realisti-
cally, most of our wars have been in full course before
Congress has gotten around to a formal declaration."
The War Powers Bill dramatically reverses the flexibility with
which Congress, historically, has exercised its constitutional power
to authorize hostilities. No longer will its consent be given im-
plicitly or after the fact. There is, however, no constitutional
6. Id. at 45 (Patterson, J.) (emphasis supplied).
7. See testimony of Secretary of State Rogers, Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on War Powers Legislation,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 489-92, May 14, 1971 (hereinafter cited as Hearings].
8. Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478, 481 (W.D. Va. 1970).
9. United States v. Mitchell, 246 F. Supp. 874, 898 (D. Conn. 1965).
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objection to the specific express formula in the bill. Congress,
pursuant to article I, section 8, clause 18, may impose upon itself
such a legislative requirement when it feels that such legislation
is necessary and proper in the exercise of its constitutional au-
thority "to declare war." It is a question of operational policy, not
of constitutional law.
The flexible historical practice had the advantage of meeting
the then current national and international needs of the United
States without over-responding by requiring a full dress debate
in Congress every time the President used the Armed Forces. The
danger, however, was that the President might assume that he
possessed greater independent authority to initiate hostilities in
a wider range of circumstances than he actually had. Also, as a
consequence of this congressional flexibility, the actual scope of
independent Presidential authority in the use of the Armed Forces
remained indistinct, the courts tending to "find" prior Congres-
sional authorization or subsequent ratification for most Presi-
dential actions. The proposed legislation will bring into sharp
focus the real extent of the President's independent role in war
making. It is a relatively simple matter to point to two areas
where the President has constitutional authority to employ the
armed forces, although the exact limits of his authority in these
areas in direct opposition to Congressional legislation is not cer-
tain.
The President's independent constitutional role lies in the two
main areas of repelling attacks in emergencies and of waging,
as Commander in Chief, hostilities authorized in some fashion by
Congress. As for his emergency powers it has been said:
Unquestionably the President can start the gun at home or
abroad to meet force with force; he is not only authorized
but bound to do so. 1"
The proposed bill, in Subsections (1) (2) and (3) of Section 3,
recognizes this independent Presidential authority in emergencies.
However, if these three subsections are considered by Congress
to be a complete, exhaustive enumeration of the President's con-
stitutional emergency power to commit the armed forces, they are
of doubtful constitutional validity." For example, Section 3(1),
10. Id. at 898, citing the Supreme Court in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
635, 668 (1862).
11. Report 92-606 of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs on Bill
2956, Feb. 9, 1972, states that the committee feels that Section 3 makes
ample provision for the President's constitutional emergency powers.
[Hereinafter cited as Report 92-606].
providing only for the defense of United States territory, does
not encompass a sudden attack by an enemy upon the territory
of a foreign ally, the occupation of whose territory would be a
direct threat to the territory of the United States. Obvious ex-
amples would be attacks on Canada, Mexico or the Bahamas. The
Court in the Mitchell case acknowledged the existence of this
broader territorial view of the emergency power of the President
to repell attacks:
And under our established concept of international de-
pendence and foreign commitments, this power [of the
Commander in Chief to meet force with force] must ex-
tend to repelling attacks upon our allies which threaten
our own security.
12
A second example, outside the enumerated emergency powers
in the bill, is humanitarian intervention to save non-American
nationals. Such a contingency is not provided for in Section 3(3),
which limits itself only to American citizens. The United States
Air Force cooperated with Belgium in the rescue of Belgian na-
tionals in the Congo in the 1960's. The United States Navy saved
many North Vietnamese fleeing to the South as Viet Minh forces
occupied areas around Haiphong as the French withdrew in 1954.
These two illustrations merely indicate that future emergency
events demanding Executive use of the armed forces will, in all
probability, not stay within the three categories listed in the bill.
The provision, also in Section 3, forbidding the President to
introduce armed forces in "situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated" without the prior express con-
sent of Congress touches areas of show-of-force where the Presi-
dent himself does not know the exact reaction of the group against
whom such force is shown. For examples from the recent past
there are the Berlin confrontations, the dispatch of a United States
warship to the East Pakistan coast during the 1971 Pakistan war
with India, the dispatch of a war ship from the United States
East Coast to the Middle East when Jordan was threatened by
tanks from Syria, and the Cuban missile crisis. These examples
could be interpreted as requiring prior express congressional as-
sent under Section 3 of the proposed War Powers Act. It would
have been better, therefore, had the Senate deleted the phrase "or
in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances" and left the sudden dispatch of
troops to the President in the exercise either of his emergency
power or of his authority as Commander in Chief in the move-
ment of troops in peace time.
Leaving the sphere of the President's powers in emergencies,
as outlined in Section 3 (1) (2) (3), and turning to Section 3 (4), two




separate Constitutional problems are encountered. The first deals
with the constitutional authority of the President to wage a war
which has been authorized by Congress. After the hearings on
the War Powers Bill it was concluded by the Foreign Relations
Committee that under Section 3(4) the President would have been
required to get specific Congressional statutory authorization to
strike at the North Vietnamese forces in Laos and Cambodia op-
erating against South Vietnam, even if authority had been given
by Congress to defend South Vietnam from North Vietnamese at-
tacks."3 This conclusion was disputed by Professor Moore, a witness
at the Hearings, who thought that it easily could be considered a
part of the waging of the war already in progress.14 The latter opin-
ion would appear to be a reasonable Constitutional interpretation
of Presidential authority to wage war under the facts surround-
ing the incursion. The questionable interpretation by the Senate
Committee of Section 3(4) is not, however, required from the ex-
press wording of the Section. This subsection addresses itself
only to the initiating of hostilities and not to the control of hos-
tilities already in progress.
The second Constitutional problem in Section 3 (4) is the ability
of Congress to authorize, in advance, the President to initiate hos-
tilities when he considers the time and events appropriate. If such
delegation of discretion to the President is not circumscribed by
Congress it could be an improper delegation to the President of
Congress' authority to "declare war." This view was emphasized
by Professor Bickel, a witness before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee15 and was one of the questions concerning the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution which was so "troubling" to Justice Stewart in
Mora v. McNamara.16 Therefore, to avoid the problem in practice,
the "specific statutory authority" granted the President should
be specific both as to length of time, place and circumstances.
The last comment on Section 3(4) is directed to the prohibition
against the use of United States military advisors where the
foreign troops they are accompanying are about to go into "hos-
tilities." This is the furthest extension of control in the bill by
the Senate of the President as Commander in Chief. Such "hostili-
ties" could be sporadic local police actions against small bands of
subversives. This is an obvious attempt of the authors of the bill
13. Report 92-606, supra note 11, at 18.
14. John Norton Moore, School of Law, University of Virginia, whose
referenced testimony is in Hearings, supra note 7, at 481.
15. Hearings, supra note 7, at 562-63.
16. 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
to prevent, in peace time, possible United States involvement in a
future war similar to Vietnam, rather than the exercise of Con-
gressional authority to initiate hostilities.
The remarks of Senator Fulbright pertaining to criticism of
President Truman's dispatch of troops to Europe in 1951 cor-
rectly, it is felt, states the Constitutional authority of the President
in his command of the armed forces:
Congress has the right and power to raise the Armed
Forces, but the President has the responsibility for the
command of these forces. If in the exercise of his best
judgment the defense of this country requires the sending
of troops to Europe, he has the power and the duty to do
so. Congress, of course, can refuse to appropriate the
money for the troops but that is a decision for which
Congress must take the responsibility. In the long run the
decisions on strategy are best left to the Executive. That
is the plain intent of our constitutional system. It would
be dangerous for our future welfare to change the under-
lying principle simply because a strong minority or even
a majority of the Congress may lack the confidence in the
wisdom of the Executive in some particular instance such
as the present one. 17
The constitutional difficulties with the bill are not, as men-
tioned before, its requirement for express Congressional consent
before hostilities. That is a question of Congressional policy.
Rather, constitutional problems are created by the apparent limits
on the President's emergency powers contained in Sections 3(1)
(2) and (3) and on his powers as Commander in Chief to send
troops abroad under certain dangerous circumstances in Section 3
and as advisors in Section 3 (4).
17. 97 CoN. REc. 520 (1951).
